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Can we learn more about Victorian jurisprudence through novels than we can 
through the works of Austin, Stephen or other Victorian jurists?  Ian Ward’s short 
book sets out to prove we can, by taking the reader on a romp through Victorian life; 
blending fiction, jurisprudence and the lives of his selected authors in an entertaining 
account of nineteenth century England.  Drawing on this array of sources, the book 
provides a compelling feminist account of the regulation of Victorian sex, noting that 
while Austin wrote for a narrow and circumscribed circle of jurists, Dickens wrote for 
a public of hundreds of thousands.  He is therefore critically important and “we need 
to read his novels, as we do those of Thackeray, Eliot and Gaskell, and Wood and 
Braddon and so on, because thousands and thousands of Victorians did…. [These] are 
the texts which shaped the Victorian mind, what it thought about women and their 
sexuality, about marriage, and about the law which was somehow supposed to 
regulate it” (28). 
To analyse these narratives, Ward intertwines key pieces of fiction and excerpts from 
the lives of their authors with discussion of case law and legislative developments, 
effectively conjuring up a sometimes fevered literary and jurisprudential 
atmosphere.  The period is one in which there was an explosion of literacy and 
reading, with both novels and newspapers reaching a huge new audience, and with 
women playing a far greater role as both readers and authors than ever before.  
Ward notes that “the idea that fiction played a vital role in the nurturing of an 
emergent female consciousness in nineteenth century England has become a critical 
commonplace” (85).  Books were being written by women for women, none more so 
that the intensely contemporary ‘sensational’ novels, written by female authors for 
readers who were “female, middle-class and legion” (61). 
It was a society obsessed with the family, home and ‘womanly’ women (and while 
single woman could be ‘womanly’ “they were generally viewed as being odd if they 
did not sooner or later get married” (5)).  It was also a historical moment of great 
anxiety.  The mid-Victorians were anxious over the criminality of ‘fallen’ women, 
whether within marriage (bigamists or putative divorcees) or outside (prostitution, 
murder or child-murder) and even more anxious over the potential that other 
women could fall.  In this context, critical enthusiasm for moral didactic literature – 
novels which both pleased and educated – could be seen as a direct response to 
                                                          
* PhD student, Kent Law School, University of Kent, UK. ek263@kent.ac.uk  






concerns that sensationalist literature was inimical to thought and reason.  Reading 
was dangerous, and  
“If there was one thing a Victorian gentleman liked more than worrying, it was 
reading about worrying things.  The same, it was commonly felt, was true of 
his wife; indeed, of all the worrying things, few were more worrying than the 
thought that women were reading too much.  Indeed, it was commonly 
supposed that women like [Charles Dickens’ partner] Ellen Ternan fell because 
they read novels written by men such as Charles Dickens.” (4) 
Ward draws out the complexities of his literary materials, arguing that both 
sensationalist and realist novels could recommend conformity, while also citing 
instances of literature which constituted sites of resistance, challenging the law and 
legal establishment by bringing legal injustices to public attention, humanising the 
consequences of legislative injustices, and raising the voice of the silenced.   
As such, some of the novels Ward draws on are expressly critical of the law, exposing 
flaws and injustices in the law, but the methodological aim of Ward’s analysis is to go 
beyond this and to draw out the iterative relationship of literature and law.  The first 
novel discussed is Dickens’ Dombey and Son, where the law – and specifically 
criminality in the shape of assault, adultery and prostitution – is one of many dark 
shadows lurking around the house of the protagonist.  This sets out Ward’s stall, as 
the rest of the book weaves law into his narrative, showing the different ways law 
and literature combine.  This includes how specific cases influenced characters, such 
as Eliot’s Hetty Sorrel from Adam Bede and Ruth Hilton in Gaskell’s Ruth, and how 
the framework and incoherence of law regulating sex inside and outside marriage 
provided richness in realist and sensationalist plots.  Conversely, he discusses how 
narratives of law were influenced by literature.  An example of this interweaving is in 
his discussion of the interrelationship of sensationalist novels and the newly created 
Divorce Court.  Ward examines how fiction shaped the way in which real life cases 
were read by the public, and conversely, how details of the cases heard fed novelists 
with salacious materials – accounts which were, according to Queen Victoria, of “so 
scandalous a character that it makes it almost impossible for a paper to be trusted in 
the hands of a young lady or boy” (37). 
Ward takes legal frameworks as the organising principle of his book, and deals in the 
first two chapters with women falling within marriage, while the third and fourth 
chapters engage with regulation of sex outside marriage.   
The marriage section of the book opens with the notorious adultery suit brought by 
MP George Norton against the then Prime Minister, Lord Melbourne, in 1836, in 
which Norton’s wife Caroline Sheridan Norton was accused of adultery with the PM 
in an action for criminal conversation.  Prior to 1857, divorces were expensive and 
convoluted, requiring a successful criminal conversation suit and parliamentary 






approval, with approximately 2-3 successful divorces a year.  The Norton case, and 
the following 30 years’ worth of consequent fall-out, provided crucial inspiration for 
authors of adultery novels, and a familiar context for their readers.  Ward argues that 
Thackeray drew on Caroline Norton’s experiences to write The Newcomes, “one of 
the most caustic critiques of marital practice in nineteenth-century English 
literature” (38).  When divorce was introduced in the 1857 Divorce Act, the 
legislation created the Divorce Court and at the same time instituted a double 
standard whereby a wife’s petition was more difficult to obtain than a husband’s.  
Ward uses this legal shift to move to another place for literature: that of 
sensationalising the law, but also moralising and educating.   Once the Divorce Act 
was in place, and divorces were thrilling daily news items, the best-selling novel of 
Victorian Britain, Ellen Wood’s East Lynne, was published.  East Lynne related the tale 
of notorious adulteress Isabel Carlyle and encouraged readers to “contemplate 
rather more closely the implications of the 1857 Divorce Act” (53). 
The decade immediately after the creation of the Divorce Court is also the setting for 
the most absorbing chapter in Ward’s account, in which he discusses the relationship 
between law, the sensational novel, and bigamy.  Dual fuelled by the growing 
influence of French authors and the creation of the Divorce Court in 1857, novels 
about bigamy became huge sellers in the early 1860s.  Real cases such as the 
Yelverton bigamy case influenced literary creations, including Braddon’s Aurora 
Floyd, an amiable but unsettling bigamist, with “unfeminine interests and mysterious 
propensities” (74).  Such novels reached an estimated audience of 5 million, mainly 
women, readers and were distinctive not only because their plots drew from and 
played with the newly created legal framework, but also because they were radical in 
being contemporary and grounded in the immediate moment.  They also contained 
critical depth, and Ward notes that Aurora Floyd demonstrates that “If a woman 
makes a mistake, the law of marriage is not written to facilitate an easy redress.  
Matrimonial law is written by men for men, and the law of bigamy is part of that 
jurisprudence” (77).  The bigamy novels were threatening because of an “insinuation 
that their heroines were driven to criminality because the institution of marriage so 
often causes pain, and the law of marriage is unable, and unwilling to provide relief” 
(84). 
Ward then moves onto the regulation of sex outside marriage; focussing on 
illegitimacy and the cult of motherhood, before concluding with prostitution.   
On motherhood, Ward highlights the “essentially jurisprudential” (95) distinction 
between a ‘natural’ mother and an ‘unnatural’ mother, where the latter had 
conceived her children outside marriage.  In such an environment, “readers of 
Elizabeth Gaskell’s Ruth were invited to consider an alternative; that the naturalness 
of a mother was better adjudged in terms of the quality of her devotion, and an 
appreciation of her maternal responsibilities” (95).  Such accounts added to critique 
of the Poor Law regime, in which ‘unnatural’ mothers became primarily responsible 






for their offspring, and if they were unable to provide, then Boards of Guardians and 
the workhouse beckoned.  Prior to the Poor Law of 1834, fathers had been 
responsible, but the legislative change arose from a concern that this encouraged 
scheming young women and promoted immorality.  Trollope’s Jesse Phillips, 
“exposed the particular iniquity of a law which was ‘plainly deficient in legislative 
morality’” (101).  Ward argues that 
“As was the case with adultery, divorce and bigamy, the readers of novels 
such as Ruth, Adam Bede and Jessie Phillips might be expected to share a 
common appreciation that there was something amiss in regard to illegitimacy 
and infanticide, and the various, often conflicting, rarely complementary array 
of statutes intended to proscribe, or where necessary, punish, their 
incidence.” (117) 
At the same time, legislative endeavours to counter prostitution and sex outside 
marriage, including the abhorrent regime under the Contagious Diseases Act 1864, 
proved ineffective, and as further endeavours to regulate were passed, “it was 
becoming ever more crisply apparent that the law … could no more eradicate 
sexually transmitted disease than it could ensure connubial bliss” (145).  However, it 
was not lawyers who led resistance but novelists, poets and critics, with key literary 
takes on prostitution highlighting injustices embedded in jurisprudence, whilst 
simultaneously humanising the prostitute characters and raising their previously 
silenced voices, from Dickens’ Nancy to prostitutes in poems by Barrett Browning 
and both Christina and Dante Gabriel Rossetti.   
As well as highlighting the influence of law on literature and vice versa, Ward also 
argues literature is essential to give meaning and context to Victorian law.  His 
discussion draws on literature to explore the wider socio-political circumstances, 
noting that the historical moment he is examining is one of rationality and reform; 
reform focussed on efficacy rather than justice.  Quoting Elizabeth Lynn Linton, law 
could or should not regulate love, but should keep the family together and maintain 
their peace, it “should never be ‘invited into the heart of the house’, but rather ‘must 
be dragged across the threshold’ like an ‘evil spirit’” (25).  Thus, using literature to 
contextualise the reform of law, Ward shows how themes of the privacy of the 
hearth, the public place of the idealised family, anxiety about transgression of the 
norm, rationality and progress, improvement, and the desire to prevent or rescue a 
fallen woman play into legal developments.   
It is testament to the strength of Ward’s inquiry that many of these themes can also 
be identified outside of the scope of this book but in the same historical moment.  
One example is the introduction of Lord Campbell’s Fatal Accident Act in 1846, giving 
bereaved dependent families the right to sue for negligently caused death for the 
first time.  In this moment of legislative reform, the law sought to maintain the peace 
of the family and protect them from external threat; rationalising the law and 






formalising the family so that only spouses, parents and children could claim 
damages (where previously an unevenly applied regime of discretionary financial 
relief existed, through an inquest jury’s ability to name an object deodand).  At the 
same time, legislators expressed concerns about the need for law to enter the home 
to secure funds to bereaved children.  As Viscount Sandon observed in the House of 
Commons, MPs had to protect children, as a widow left to herself might marry 
another man and “the money might all be expended the day after the verdict in a 
drunken frolic.”1 
The novels Ward discusses are part of the fabric of this moment, but Ward also 
introduces us to the authors of these novels, and it is often in his discussion of their 
lives that his account is most engrossing.  The lives and attitudes of George Eliot, 
Mary Braddon, William Thackeray and others provide valuable insights into their 
literary creations and their purpose in writing fiction, but it is perhaps Charles 
Dickens who is brought to life most vividly in Ward’s narrative.  Dickens stalks 
through the book; leaving his wife for a younger woman, popping up in the public 
gallery for the Norton case, and setting up a home for fallen women.  This all builds 
towards his narcissistic, sensationalist readings of the brutal murder of Nancy by 
Sikes from Oliver Twist, designed to “perfectly petrify an audience” (121) and liable 
to result in fainting fits across the auditorium.  Ward argues that Nancy’s repeated 
death brought on Dickens’ own, and as the account illustrates, in an age driven by 
the complexities of competing obsessions between decorum, sex, rationality, 
improvement and sensationalism, Dickens’ life and death provide a compelling 
thread to follow.   
Ward closes with an appeal to law students to read Victorian novels; if they did so 
they would “learn much not just about the state of English matrimonial and criminal 
law in mid-nineteenth-century England, but about its condition today” (148).  This 
book, with its breadth and detail, has made such a reading possible for those of us 
lacking the author’s grasp of the field, but it also powerfully re-states the value of an 
approach to academic research combining law and literature.  For students 
uninterested in nineteenth century Britain, or unmoved by Aurora Floyd and East 
Lynne, the critical eye which Ward brings to bear can be applied to other fictional 
lives – Bridget Jones, Anastasia Steele or William Stoner perhaps – to identify, 
contextualise and explore the regulation of intimacy in other historical or 
contemporaneous moments and spaces.  As such, Ward’s narrative reiterates the 
potential wealth of insight which literature can bring to legal studies, as well as 
providing an enjoyable and stimulating read for those interested in family and 
criminal law, and the enduring influence of Victorian Britain on our contemporary 
lives. 
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